CASE OF R.Sz. v. HUNGARY

Conclusion Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – Protection of property (Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 – Deprivation of property
Peaceful enjoyment of possessions Possessions) Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage – award

SECOND SECTION

CASE OF R.Sz. v. HUNGARY

(Application no. 41838/11)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

2 July 2013

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of R.Sz. v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Danutė Jočienė,
Peer Lorenzen,
András Sajó,
Işıl Karakaş,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 41838/11) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr R.Sz. (“the applicant”), on 5 July 2011. The President of the Section acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court).
2. The applicant was represented by OMISSIS, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 – read alone and in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention – that the imposition of a 98% tax on part of his severance pay constituted an unjustified deprivation of property, with no remedy available. He also invoked Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
4. On 21 February 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Budapest.
6. The applicant had been employed by a State-owned limited company for about eleven years. On 1 July 2010 his employment was terminated by mutual agreement, with effect from 5 October 2010.
7. According to his labour contract, the applicant became entitled, amongst other benefits, to severance pay in the amount of four months’ salary – which was in excess by one month’s salary of that provided by the Labour Code – and to salary for the three months of his notice period. The benefits were reduced by taxes payable at that time and paid to the applicant on 2 July 2010.
The applicant’s benefits were subsequently taxed at 98% in their part exceeding 3,500,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) . The exceeding part was HUF 8,130,939 , the tax thus amounting to HUF 7,968,320 . The amount payable was HUF 4,054,085 , regard being had to the fact that the benefits had already been taxed HUF 3,914,235 on payment, on 2 July 2010.
The tax, whose due date was apparently 10 May 2011, was paid on 23 February 2011, that is, according to the rules of the second version (of 30 December 2010 – see paragraph 12) of the legislation outlined below; however, the third version (of 14 May 2011 – see paragraphs 16-17) did not change the applicant’s situation.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
8. On 22 July 2010 Parliament adopted Act no. XC of 2010 on the Adoption and Modification of Certain Economic and Financial Laws (“the Act”). The Act, which was published in the Official Gazette on 13 August 2010, introduced inter alia a new tax on certain payments for employees of the public sector – including those of State-owned enterprises such as the applicant’s employer – whose employment was terminated. Consequently, severance pay and other payments related to the termination of employment (such as salary for the notice period) exceeding HUF 2 million became subject to a 98% tax. However, income tax and social security contributions already paid could be deducted from the tax. Notwithstanding the limit of HUF 2 million, the statutory provisions on the sum of severance pay were not modified. The bill preceding the Act justified the tax with reference to public morals and the unfavourable budgetary situation of the country.
9. The Act entered into force on 1 October 2010; however, the tax was to be applied to the relevant revenues as from 1 January 2010. Simultaneously, the Constitution was also amended establishing retroactive tax liability in respect of the given tax year concerning “any remuneration against good morals” paid in the public sector.
10. The Act was challenged before the Constitutional Court within the framework of an abstract ex post facto control. This court found the relevant provisions unconstitutional in decision no. 184/2010. (X.28.) AB on 26 October 2010.
According to the Constitutional Court, revenues earned solely on the basis of relevant statutory provisions (that is, the overwhelming majority of the revenues concerned by the disputed legislation) could not be regarded as being against good morals, and therefore not even the constitutional amendment justified a retroactive 98% tax. The Constitutional Court pointed out that it reviewed the rate or amount of taxes only exceptionally; however, it held that a pecuniary burden was unconstitutional if it was of a confiscatory nature or its extent was clearly exaggerated, i.e. was disproportionate and unjustified. Considering also the “fifty-percent rule” (Halbteilungsgrundsatz) set out by the German Federal Constitutional Court – according to which the overall tax load on assets must be limited to 50-60% of the yield on those assets – the court found that the 98% tax was excessive and punitive, yet it equally applied to severance pay earned in a fully untainted manner. The tax was levied on or deducted from the revenues concerned even if their morally doubtful origin could not be established. The Constitutional Court annulled the relevant provisions retroactively, that is, from the day of the Act’s entry into force. It relied on the above arguments, rather than on considerations about the protection of property, to which its scrutiny did not extend in the case.
11. The Constitutional Court’s decision contained in particular the following considerations:
“5.2. … [The Act] applies to … payments originating in unconditional statutory entitlements and defined by objective criteria, that is, to those … received from any source specified in the Act and exceeding the [relevant] amount …. The Act does not apply only to budgetary institutions but to other, State-owned employers as well. The use of private resources depends on the citizens’ relatively free choices and autonomous decisions. However, decisions concerning public funds are different. [The impugned legislation] relates to public funds, and determines – at least indirectly – the use of public resources.
5.3. … Depending on the circumstances, [the] 98% tax may apply to payments which derive from the obligatory application of cogent legal provisions. … In these cases, the special tax does not function as a regulatory instrument, given its inescapable factual basis. Nor does it aim to prevent abusive payments; its purpose is rather to levy almost the entire income [in question] for the central budget. …
The volume of public duties is considered unconstitutional if they have a confiscatory nature or amount to an evidently excessive rate of the kind which can be regarded as disproportionate and unjustified. …
The material case concerns a substantial punitive tax which also applies to payments which are received, by virtue of law and within the limits of the proper exercise of rights, upon the termination of employment in the public sector. The Act would be applied also in cases where no infringement of law can be established in connection with the payments concerning the termination of a legal relation. It would deprive the taxable persons of incomes originating in unconditional statutory entitlements. …
To increase budgetary revenues and secure a general and proportionate distribution of public burden is only the secondary and eventual purpose of the legislator when introducing such a tax. The direct purpose of the legislator in this case is to set a certain barrier on incomes by using the means of tax law. However, imposing a tax or other similar duty is no constitutional means to achieve such purpose. Several constitutional instruments are at the disposal of the legislator to accomplish its objective. It may reduce or even abolish some State allowances falling under the scope of the Act for the future, or transform the allocation system so that in the future it should not be possible to acquire further entitlements to allowances above a certain limit. Nonetheless, the discretion of the legislator only prevails in the framework of international and European community law.”
12. Upon a new bill introduced on the same day as the date of the Constitutional Court’s decision, on 16 November 2010 Parliament re-enacted the 98% tax with certain modifications, according to which this tax applied from 1 January 2005; however, for the majority of those affected (excluding some senior officials) it only applied to revenues above HUF 3.5 million. The new legislation was published in the Official Gazette of 16 November and entered into force on 30 December 2010.
13. At the same time, Parliament again amended the Constitution, allowing retroactive taxation going back five years. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s powers were limited: the amended articles of the Constitution contained a restriction on the Constitutional Court’s right to review legislation on budgetary and tax issues. This restriction – which has also been maintained in the new Basic Law in force from 1 January 2012 – allows for constitutional review only in respect of violations of the right to life and human dignity, the protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the rights related to Hungarian citizenship.
14. Upon a petition for an abstract ex post facto control, on 6 May 2011 the Constitutional Court annulled – notwithstanding its limited powers – the five-year retroactive application of the 98% tax in decision
no. 37/2011 (V.10.) AB, relying on the right to human dignity. However, the reasoning of the decision underlined that only the taxation of revenues gathered before the 2010 tax year constituted a violation of the right to human dignity. The Constitutional Court did not find unconstitutional as such the Act’s presumption that the relevant revenues infringed good morals; however, it ruled that this presumption should be susceptible to a legal challenge. In view of its limited jurisdiction, it did not consider the substantive aspects of the tax.
15. The Constitutional Court’s decision contained in particular the following considerations:
“1. … The Constitutional Court has held that the retroactive effect of the Act does not only apply to incomes earned contra bonos mores, but also to incomes originating in unconditional statutory entitlements. Payments of statutory amounts [which have not been abolished] cannot be regarded as being contra bonos mores.
As regards the prospective provisions of the Act, the Constitutional Court has pointed out that the tax in issue is also applicable to payments received legally and within the limits of proper exercise of rights upon termination of employment in the public sector, and that it deprives the persons concerned of incomes originating in unconditional statutory entitlements. However, in this case the legislator interpreted the “special rate” as an entire withdrawal of the income, by which it overstepped its constitutional mandate and breached the amended constitutional rule of distributing public burden.
2. In pursuit of decision [no. 184/2010 (X.28.)AB], Parliament amended the rules on the Constitutional Court’s competence as well as the provision of the Basic Law determining the distribution of public burden, and re-enacted the special tax. …
2.2. … [The new legislation] contains no reference to the notion “contra bonos mores”, and allows for retroactive law-making with regard to the fifth tax year in arrears as well as for [any] imposition falling short of [the total] deprivation of income. …
4.1.1. … The legal relations falling under the scope of the special tax are typically regulated by the so-called “legal status” Acts [i.e. the Acts concerning the legal status of civil servants]. [In this context, the] salary is specified by the so-called “pay scale”, which is independent from the parties and obligatory for them.
[Moreover,] the personal scope of the special tax also includes employers and employees, mainly those who belong under the Labour Code, who can significantly influence the amount of the allowance received upon the termination of employment. …
In this respect, the special tax is a tax whose purpose is not to generate [State] revenue. It is, in this connection, a regulatory instrument. … Certain taxes may serve not only the purpose of increasing State revenue, but also function as regulatory instruments. Secondarily, but not insignificantly, [this] taxation can be also seen as part of the State’s economic policy. In this regard the legislature is afforded an exceptionally broad constitutional margin of discretion. …
4.1.4. … The special tax is not a general income tax applicable to all types of income, but rather a particular tax levied on non-repetitive, non-regular payments which relate to certain factual circumstances (i.e. the termination of a legal relation) and which exceed a certain limit. …
Such a tax with ex nunc effect cannot be considered to violate the right to protection of human dignity or to constitute an improper interference by the State with individual autonomy. Taking into account its base, the incomes not belonging in that base and their amounts, the special tax cannot be considered as completely dispossessing the tax subjects. …
The individual’s acquisition of the income subject to the special tax is restricted by a public-law limitation originating in that tax …
4.2.4. … In case of misuse of public resources, the limitation on payments might even have retroactive effect, [under] section 70/I (2) of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has already emphasised in its decision [no. 184/2010 (X.28.)AB] that a retroactive special tax may be imposed on unfairly high payments, on certain types of severance pay or on compensation for significant periods of unused vacation time accumulated over years; the Act aiming at preventing abuses and endorsing society’s sense of justice is not unconstitutional in itself, but must remain within the framework of the amended Constitution.
4.2.5. However, to impose tax on incomes [lawfully] acquired during the tax year … cannot be considered as the implementation of the new paragraph (2) of section 70/I of the Constitution, but rather interference by a public authority with individual autonomy going to such lengths that cannot have constitutional justification, and therefore violates the taxpayers’ human dignity. …
The special tax does not provide for a fair and just assessment of individual circumstances; its retroactive rules apply to everyone [with two exceptions mentioned above] without differentiation. Nor does it take into account objective circumstances concerning a wide range of taxpayers, such as the economic crisis or emergency situations, which may disadvantageously influence the individuals’ circumstances. …”
16. On 9 May 2011 Parliament again re-enacted the retroactive application of the 98% tax. The amendment to Act no. XC of 2010 was published in the Official Gazette on 13 May and entered into force on 14 May 2011. It provided that only relevant revenues earned after 1 January 2010 should be subject to the tax. The amended legislation did not contain any remedy available to those affected.
17. The Act, as in force as of 14 May 2011, provides (in sections 8-12/B) that the special tax rules are applicable to incomes received on 1 January 2010 or after. Incomes shall be subject to a 98% special tax where the private individual has worked at an economic operator or an organisation operating from public money, the payment is effected on account of the termination of the private individual’s work relationship, and the amount of the income exceeds HUF 3,5 (in certain cases 2) million. Incomes received between 1 January 2010 and 29 December 2010 were declared by private individuals by means of self-assessment, in tax returns submitted until 25 February or 10 May 2011 (depending on the taxpayer group). The tax was payable by the same dates.
Members of Parliament, vice mayors and Members of the European Parliament declared their income earned in 2010 and subject to the special tax in a different manner, in a separate tax return submitted by 31 July 2011. They paid the special tax by the same date. Those who retired immediately on dismissal were exempted from the tax. Persons subjected to the payment of the special tax declared their taxable incomes earned between 1 January 2011 and 13 May 2011 by way of tax returns submitted by 25 February or 20 May 2012 (depending on the taxpayer group), and paid the tax by the same dates. In all other cases, the special tax is deducted by the payment issuer as withholding tax, and the deduction is indicated in the private individual’s tax return for the given revenue year.
Any charges paid by or deducted from the private individual including, in particular, personal income tax or individual contributions shall be regarded as tax advances paid on the special tax.
III. RELEVANT LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
18. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides as follows:
Article 34 – Social security and social assistance
“1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices.”
The European Court of Justice held in Case C-499/08 Andersen v Region Syddanmark, [2010] ECR I-09343 as follows:
“29. The aim pursued by the severance allowance of protecting workers with many years of service in an undertaking and helping them to find new employment falls within the category of legitimate employment policy and labour market objectives provided for in Article 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.”
European Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (2009/384/EC) provides as follows:
“1. Excessive risk-taking in the financial services industry and in particular in banks and investment firms has contributed to the failure of financial undertakings and to systemic problems in the Member States and globally….
5. Creating appropriate incentives within the remuneration system itself should reduce the burden on risk management and increase the likelihood that these systems become effective. Therefore, there is a need to establish principles on sound remuneration policies.”
In the case Michel Bourgès-Maunoury, Marie-Louise Heintz v Direction des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir concerning the compatibility with European Union primary law of a national provision on the procedure for calculating a wealth tax, Advocate General Cruz Villalón reiterated that the principle that rules governing tax law and the exercise of fiscal power must not have confiscatory effects is a “well-known and widely-recognised idea” (Case C 558/10, Michel Bourgès-Maunoury, Marie-Louise Heintz v Direction des services fiscaux d’Eure-et-Loir 12 Dec 2011, OJ C-46, 12, Opinion of AG Villalón).
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW
Germany – Federal Constitutional Court
19. In a judgment of 22 June 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court held that, according to Article 14 of the Basic Law, the use of property served the purpose of private gain and the public good. In that sense, property tax, combined with other taxes, might take no more than 50% of the income from property (Halbteilungsgrundsatz). The overall tax burden should moreover not run counter to the principle of equality demanding the division of burden depending on the contributing capacity (BVerfG, 2 BvL 37/91, 22.6.1995).
In its subsequent decision of 18 January 2006 (BVerfG, 2 BvR 2194/99, 18.01.2006), the Federal Constitutional Court found that even though tax load fell within the ambit of Article 14 of the Basic Law, that is, the protection of property, the overall burden through business and personal income tax, in the particular circumstances, did not infringe the complainant’s right to property. In the instant case the overall tax burden in business and personal income tax combined amounted to 57.58%. The Federal Constitutional Court noted in this regard that it was permissible to charge high income with higher tax burden, as long as the taxable person, after deduction of the relevant tax, disposed of a remaining income representing his private performance.
France – Conseil constitutionnel
20. In decision no. 2007-555 DC (16 August 2007; Act pertaining to work, employment and purchasing power), the Conseil constitutionnel held as follows :
“24o The requirement deriving from Article 13 of the declaration of 1789 would not be complied with if taxation were to be of a confiscatory nature or subjected a certain category of taxpayers to an excessive burden in comparison with their ability to pay taxes. The principle of the capping of the proportion of a tax household’s income allocated to paying direct taxes, far from infringing the principle of equality before public burden sharing, is intended to avoid a patent infringement of this same principle;”
Switzerland – Federal Supreme Court
21. The Federal Supreme Court held that a taxation scheme that is confiscatory in its effects and not limited in time would infringe the essence of the right to property (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court, BGE 106 Ia 342, 349; BGE 128 II 112, 126). To date, the Federal Supreme Court has not found that any taxation scheme was confiscatory.
Decision no. BGE 128 II 112, 126 contains the following passage:
“10 bb) … In taxation matters, however, it [the guarantee of property, as set out in Article 26 of the Federal Constitution] does not go beyond the prohibition of confiscatory taxation. Therefore, a tax to be levied may not damage the very essence of private property. It is the task of the legislative branch to preserve the substance of the taxpayer’s assets and to allow him the chance to create new ones. In fact, a tax rate expressed in percentages is not the only decisive criterion in order to determine whether a taxation scheme has a confiscatory effect. It is necessary to examine the burden of the imposition for a rather long period and by not taking into account extraordinary circumstances. In order to accomplish this, all specific facts must be taken into consideration: the length and the gravity of the interference as well as the accumulation with other taxes or charges and the possibility to shift the tax to another person …”.
Decision of the Federal Supreme Court no. 2P.139/2004 contains the following passage:
“4.2 The Federal Supreme Court has held that it is not compatible with Article 26 of the Federal Constitution if an annuity for life, inherited by bequest, of initially CHF 2200 per month is – regardless of the ability to pay other taxes of the person in receipt of the pension –taxed at 55 % in total, in terms of inheritance and income taxes as well as other expenses, which (taking into account of the tax sum due for over CHF 200,000) were necessary for their financing (Decision P.1704/1984, published in: ASA 56 p. 439 et seq.). In that specific case the specific circumstances were relevant because the heir could not secure her own existence after paying the taxes for the annuity for life.”
United States – Supreme Court
22. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) the Supreme Court dealt with the following problem: According to the provisions of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, after 15 November 1943 no salary or compensation was to be paid to certain individuals, who were then government employees, out of any moneys then or thereafter appropriated, except for services as jurors or members of armed forces unless they were prior to that date again appointed to jobs by the President with advice and consent of the Senate. In the background of the statute challenged lay the House of Representatives’ feeling that in the late 1930s many ‘subversives’ were occupying influential positions in the Government and elsewhere and that their influence must not remained unchallenged. In 1943 the respondents, Lovett, Watson and Dodd, were and had been for several years working for the Government. The Government agencies which had lawfully employed them were fully satisfied with the quality of their work and wished to keep them employed in their jobs. The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the provision challenged was not merely to cut off the plaintiffs’ compensation through regular disbursing channels, but permanently to bar them from government service and it was designed to force the employing agencies to discharge respondents and to bar their being hired by any other governmental agency. The Supreme Court reiterated that the Constitution barred such legislative acts by providing that “no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”. It found that the relevant provision was designed to apply to particular individuals and operated as a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion from a chosen vocation. It ruled that this permanent proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government was punishment of those individuals without a judicial trial and thus carried the usual characteristics of bills of attainder. The Supreme Court found that “legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial, are ‘bills of attainder’ prohibited by the Constitution”.
The subject matter of the case Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) was as follows: The plaintiffs (Armstrong and al.) furnished various materials to Rice for use in construction of boats. Upon Rice’s default, the Government exercised its option as to ten of the boat hulls still under construction and removed these properties to out-of-state naval shipyards for use in the completion of the boats. When the transfer occurred, the plaintiffs had not been paid for their materials and they were not paid afterwards, either. Petitioners therefore contended that they had liens. The Supreme Court held “that there was a taking of these liens for which just compensation is due under the Fifth Amendment. It is true that not every destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense. This case and many others reveal the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destructions of property by lawful governmental actions are compensable ‘takings’ and what destructions are ‘consequential’ and therefore not compensable… The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. A fair interpretation of this constitutional protection entitles these lienholders to just compensation here.”
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) the Supreme Court held that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act 1992 amounted to an unconstitutional regulatory taking of property. It held that the economic impact of the Act was substantial as to Petitioner, in that it required Eastern Enterprises to contribute large sums of money to a pension fund for employees employed in the 1950s and 1960s solely because those payments could not be allocated to other coal companies that were currently operating in the coal industry. The retroactive effect of the Act imposed a substantial economic injury on Eastern Enterprises that could not have been anticipated. Moreover, the challenged statute interfered with Eastern Enterprises’ expectations in that in 1987 the company sold off its remaining holdings in coal operations and completely quit this industry. The statute’s requirement for Eastern Enterprises to undertake the obligation at issue clearly interfered with the expectations of Eastern when it sold off its interest in coal operations. Lastly, the nature of the government action was unusual because it retroactively applied a substantial economic burden on Eastern Enterprises. For the Supreme Court, the character of the government action was substantial and invasive. The balance of the factors resulted in the finding of an unconstitutional taking requiring just compensation.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 OF THE CONVENTION
23. The applicant complained that the levying of tax at a rate of 98% on part of his severance pay had amounted to a deprivation of property which was unjustified. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Government contested that argument.
A. Admissibility
24. The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
a. The Government
25. The Government did not dispute that the contested deprivation of revenue had amounted to an interference with the applicant’s right to property. However, in their view, this interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of satisfying society’s sense of justice and of protecting the public purse. These aims of general interest were also recognised by the European Union which had initiated legislative steps (see paragraph 18 above) against excessive severance payments, as their amount often per se violated society’s sense of justice and the remuneration policy applied in the financial sector to executive officers had contributed to the international financial crisis of the past years.
26. The Government were further of the opinion that, in order to achieve the above aims of general interest, taxation can, in a democratic society, be regarded as the most suitable regulatory means. In so far as the impugned tax could be seen as modifying the contents of the applicant’s existing employment contract, they submitted that respect for contracts already concluded required that their modification or cancellation take place according to the laws, even if they contained seemingly lawful commitments at the expense of the State budget violating the society’s sense of justice.
27. The Government pointed out that by introducing the special tax the lawmaker had intended to strike a fair balance between the aim pursued and the limitation on the individual’s rights – by paying, at the same time, due attention to the circumstance that, in the midst of a deep world-wide economic crisis, additional burdens should be borne not only by the State but also by other market participants including senior civil servants and senior managers of State-owned enterprises, capable of influencing their own benefits. In the Government’s view, a wide margin of appreciation should be left to the national authorities in this respect. Significantly high tax rates were not unknown under the various tax regimes.
The Government also emphasised that severance not exceeding HUF 3.5 million did not fall under the impugned Act (in this part, it was subject to the general personal income tax rate of 16%); therefore the sharing of burdens should be regarded as fair and just. In this connection the Government submitted that this sum was approximately equivalent to sixteen months’ average salary in Hungary in 2010.
28. The deprivation of revenue had not imposed an excessive individual burden on the applicant, either. He had not been deprived of an existing possession or income, therefore the payment of the tax had not entailed unbearable hardships for him. The rate of the tax had not been excessive and – having regard to average Hungarian revenues, the social and economic situation and the amount of benefits received by the applicant – had not imposed a disproportionate burden on the applicant or endangered his subsistence.
b. The applicant
29. The applicant submitted that he had received the severance pay lawfully – under the work agreement with his employer – but had had to pay back virtually the entire amount half a year later, retroactively, pursuant to the newly enacted Act. In his view, society itself had no “sense of social justice”; therefore such an aim could not be justified as one of public interest. Nor could the economic crisis serve as a basis for deprivation of private property in a democracy. The purpose of the impugned tax was furthermore questionable bearing in mind that a more favourable deadline was applicable for Members of Parliament and others. A 98% tax burden was so disproportionate that it should be considered as a disguised deprivation of property in violation of the Convention. Consequently, the intervention could not be considered either as “prescribed by the law” or “pursuing a general interest”.
30. Moreover, the applicant argued that he had received the severance pay significantly earlier than the end of his employment. By the time his employment had terminated he had already spent most of the money, unaware that he would have to retroactively pay back 98% thereof. Therefore the measure in question constituted a disproportionate and excessive burden for him.
2. The Court’s assessment
a. Whether there was an interference with the applicant’s “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
31. In its judgment of 23 September 1982 in the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, the Court analysed Article 1 as comprising “three distinct rules”: the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest (Series A no. 52, § 61). The Court further observed that, before inquiring whether the first general rule has been complied with, it must determine whether the last two are applicable (ibid.). The three rules are not, however, “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, among many other authorities, James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, § 37, Series A no. 98).
Moreover, an interference, including one resulting from a measure to secure payment of taxes, must strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a whole, including the second paragraph: there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims pursued. The question to be answered is whether, in the applicant’s specific circumstances, the application of the tax law imposed an unreasonable burden on him or fundamentally undermined his financial situation – and thereby failed to strike a fair balance between the various interests involved (see M.A. and 34 Others v. Finland (dec.), no. 27793/95, 10 June 2003; Imbert de Trémiolles v. France (dec.), nos. 25834/05 and 27815/05 (joined), 4 January 2008; Spampinato v. Italy (dec.), no. 69872/01, 29 March 2007; and Wasa Liv Ömsesidigt, Försäkringsbolaget Valands Pensionsstiftelse v. Sweden, no. 13013/87, Commission decision of 14 December 1988, Decisions and Reports 58, p. 186).
32. The Court recalls that in certain circumstances loss of ownership of property resulting from a legislative measure or from an order of a court will not be equated with a “deprivation” of possessions: in the cases of AGOSI v. the United Kingdom (24 October 1986, Series A no. 108) and Air Canada v. the United Kingdom (5 May 1995, Series A no. 316-A), the forfeiture or other loss of ownership was treated as a “control of use” of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 Protocol No. 1. In Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands (23 February 1995, Series A no. 306-B), impoundment was considered as a measure securing the payment of taxes within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 in fine, while in Beyeler v. Italy ([GC], no. 33202/96, ECHR 2000 I), the interference with the applicant’s property rights was examined under the first sentence of that Article.
The Court does not consider it necessary to rule on whether the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 applies in this case. The complexity of the factual and legal position prevents the impugned measure from being classified in a precise category. The Court recalls that the situation envisaged in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 is only a particular instance of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property as guaranteed by the general rule set forth in the first sentence (see, for example, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1986, § 106, Series A no. 102). The Court therefore considers that it should examine the situation complained of in the light of that general rule (cf. Beyeler, cited above, § 106).
33. In the Court’s view, the classification of a general measure taken in furtherance of a social policy of redistribution as a “control of use” of property rather than a “deprivation” of possessions is not decisive in so far as the principles governing the question of justification are substantially the same, requiring both a legitimate aim and the preservation of a fair balance between the aim served and the individual property rights in question.
Furthermore, a legislative amendment which removes a legitimate expectation may amount in its own right to an interference with “possessions” (see, mutatis mutandis, Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, §§ 67-71 and 79, ECHR 2005–IX; Draon v. France [GC], no. 1513/03, §§ 70-72, 6 October 2005; and Hasani v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20844/09, 30 September 2010).
34. In the present case, the Court notes that the parties agree that the impugned taxation represents an interference with the applicant’s right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
The Court will examine the issue under the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, subject to the specific rule concerning the payment of taxes contained in Article 1 in fine.
b. Lawfulness of the interference
i. General principles
35. The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires that any interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful: indeed, the second sentence of the first paragraph of that Article authorises the deprivation of possessions “subject to the conditions provided for by law”. Moreover, the rule of law, one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is a notion inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC] (merits), no. 25701/94, § 79, ECHR 2000–XII, and Broniowski v. Poland [GC], no. 31443/96, § 147, ECHR 2004 V).
36. However, the existence of a legal basis in domestic law does not suffice, in itself, to satisfy the principle of lawfulness. In addition, the legal basis must have a certain quality, namely it must be compatible with the rule of law and must provide guarantees against arbitrariness.
37. It follows that, in addition to being in accordance with the domestic law of the Contracting State, including its Constitution, the legal norms upon which the deprivation of property is based should be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in their application (see Guiso-Gallisay v. Italy, no. 58858/00, §§ 82-83, 8 December 2005). The Court would add that similar considerations apply to interferences with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.
As to the notion of “foreseeability”, its scope depends to a considerable degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see, mutatis mutandis, Sud Fondi S.r.l. and Others v. Italy, no. 75909/01, § 109, 20 January 2009). In particular, a rule is “foreseeable” when it affords a measure of protection against arbitrary interferences by the public authorities (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 143, ECHR–2012). Similarly, the applicable law must provide minimum procedural safeguards commensurate with the importance of the principle at stake (see, mutatis mutandis, Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 88, 14 September 2010; Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia [GC], no. 71243/01, §§ 96-98, 25 October 2012).
38. The Court would, moreover, reiterate the finding in its settled case-law that the national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In matters of general social and economic policy, on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the domestic policy-maker should be afforded a particularly broad margin of appreciation (see, for example, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 65731/01, § 52, ECHR 2006–VI).
39. In so far as the tax sphere is concerned, the Court’s well-established position is that States may be afforded some degree of additional deference and latitude in the exercise of their fiscal functions under the lawfulness test (see National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v. the United Kingdom, 23 October 1997, §§ 75 to 83, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997–VII; OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, no. 14902/04, § 559, 20 September 2011).
40. Moreover, since in the present case the interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions was incarnated by a tax measure, it is convenient to point out that retroactive taxation can be applicable essentially to remedy technical deficiencies of the law, in particular where the measure is ultimately justified by public-interest considerations. There is in fact an obvious and compelling public interest to ensure that private entities do not enjoy the benefit of a windfall in a changeover to a new tax-payment regime (see National etc., cited above, §§ 80 to 83).
However, no such deficiency of the law has been demonstrated in the circumstances of the present case. Therefore, the Court considers that particular caution is called for when assessing whether or not the impugned measure was “lawful” for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
ii. Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case
41. The Court notes that the taxation of the severance pay in question was due after the enactment of the final version of the impugned legislation. In the applicant’s particular case, the tax was actually paid prior to that date, under the intermediary rules (see paragraph 7 above). In any case, the taxation complained of can be argued to have certain retroactive features. In particular, the taxed benefits themselves were generated on the applicant’s dismissal on 1 July 2010 and were paid on 2 July 2010 (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above) – which preceded the entry into force of the final amendment of the Act on 14 May 2011 (see paragraph 16 above).
42. The Court cannot overlook the legislative process leading to the enactment of the law affecting the applicant. It observes that the Constitutional Court found, in its first decision (see paragraph 11 above), the measure unconstitutional for being confiscatory (especially in regard to statutorily provided severance pay to civil servants who could not be considered to have received it in violation of good morals or otherwise illegally).
In its second decision (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above) the Constitutional Court held that for the current tax year (that is, for 2010), the tax was not unconstitutional in regard to severance payments which were made before the entry into force of the Act, since it did not violate human dignity – which was the only basis for constitutional evaluation of a tax law after the reduction of the competences of the Constitutional Court. This did not, however, change the finding of substantive unconstitutionality of essentially identical provisions of the original Tax Act – only that the Constitutional Court could not review the slightly amended provisions of the Amendment.
The modified Tax Act was enacted on 9 May 2011, published on 13 May 2011 and entered into force the next day, 14 May 2011, being applicable to severance and related payments earned after 1 January 2010 (see paragraph 16 above). However, the applicant had received the severance payment in question more than ten months earlier.
43. The Court also notes that the rules under which the applicant paid the tax in question were subsequently annulled by the Constitutional Court and the missing legislation was substituted for only on 14 May 2011 (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above), which in the Court’s eyes raises some doubts as to the presence of a proper legal basis. Moreover, the Court considers that the decisions of the Constitutional Court as such raise certain issues as to the constitutionality – and therefore the legality – of the impugned Act.
The Court nevertheless finds that the final amendment of the Act can be accepted as providing a legal basis for the measure in question, taking into account the degree of additional deference and latitude afforded in this field (see paragraph 39 above). It considers that it is not necessary to take a position on the legality of the impugned tax measures, which concerned the applicant’s employment and severance pay, both having occurred long before the entry force of the Act, since this issue is taken into consideration under the proportionality test (see paragraphs 54 to 62 below).
c. Public interest
44. The applicant challenged the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the impugned measure. In this connection, the Court reiterates that, because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in the public interest”. Under the system of protection established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a problem of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of property or interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a certain margin of appreciation. Furthermore, the notion of “public interest” is necessarily extensive (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 106).
45. The Court further reiterates that the levying of taxes constitutes in principle an interference with the right guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that such interference may be justified under the second paragraph of that Article, which expressly provides for an exception in respect of the payment of taxes or other contributions. However, this issue is nonetheless within the Court’s control (see paragraphs 31 and 34 above).
46. Moreover, it is naturally in the first place for the national authorities to decide what kind of taxes or contributions are to be collected. The decisions in this area will commonly involve the appreciation of political, economic and social questions which the Convention leaves within the competence of the States parties, the domestic authorities being better placed than the Court in this connection. The power of appreciation of the States parties in such matters is therefore a wide one (see Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH, cited above, § 60, and National etc., cited above, §§ 80-82).
47. However, as regards the Government’s implied reference to European Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC (see paragraphs 18 and 25 above), the Court finds that this consideration is immaterial in regard to the applicant. The measures envisioned in the Recommendation, which will be applicable in the future to restrict excessive payments in the financial sector, were conceived because “excessive risk-taking in the financial services industry and in particular in banks and investment firms has contributed to the failure of financial undertakings and to systemic problems in the Member States and globally.” The Recommendation suggests national regulation that provides for performance-based components of remuneration based on longer-term performance and contains no reference to social justice expectations. For the Court, excessive risk-taking in the financial sector is irrelevant in the applicant’s particular case.
48. Nevertheless, given the above margin of appreciation regarding the determination of what is “in the public interest”, granted to general measures interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the Court accepts that the “sense of social justice of the population”, in combination with the interest to protect the public purse and to distribute the public burden satisfies the Convention requirement of a legitimate aim, notwithstanding its broadness. The Court has no convincing evidence on which to conclude that the reasons referred to by the Government were manifestly devoid of any reasonable basis (compare and contrast Tkachevy v. Russia, no. 35430/05, § 50, 14 February 2012).
However, serious doubts remain as to the relevance of these considerations in regard to the applicant who only received a contractually stipulated compensation and could not have been made responsible for the fiscal problems which the State intended to remedy. While the Court recognises that the impugned measure was intended to protect the public purse against excessive severance payments, it is not convinced that this goal was primarily served by taxation. As the Constitutional Court noticed, there was a possibility to change severance rules and reduce the amounts which were contrary to public interest, but the authorities did not opt for this course of action. However, it is not necessary for the Court to decide at this juncture on the adequacy of a measure that formally serves a social goal, since this measure is in any event subject to the proportionality test.
d. Proportionality
i. General principles
49. Even if it has taken place subject to the conditions provided for by law – implying the absence of arbitrariness – and in the public interest, an interference with the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions must always strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised by the impugned measure (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 93, ECHR 2006 V, and also paragraph 31 above).
50. In determining whether this requirement is met, the Court reiterates that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (see Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, § 75, ECHR 1999-III, and Herrmann v. Germany [GC], no. 9300/07, § 74, 26 June 2012). Nevertheless, the Court cannot abdicate its power of review and must therefore determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, § 93, ECHR 2005 VI). In the determination of the proportionality of the measure, the Court did in the past also consider the personal situation of the applicants, including their good faith (see Vistiņš and Perepjolkins, cited above, § 120).
51. In order to assess the conformity of the State’s conduct with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court must conduct an overall examination of the various interests at issue, having regard to the fact that the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and effective”, not theoretical or illusory. It must go beneath appearances and look into the reality of the situation at issue, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, including the conduct of the parties to the proceedings, the means employed by the State and the implementation of those means. Where an issue in the general interest is at stake, it is incumbent on the public authorities to act in good time, and in an appropriate and consistent manner (see Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı v. Turkey, no. 34478/97, § 46, 9 January 2007, and Bistrović v. Croatia, no. 25774/05, § 35, 31 May 2007).
52. In the context of tax collection, the Court considers that the suitability of methods is a consideration in the establishment of proportionality of a measure of interference (see, in the context of exercise of the State’s right of pre-emption, Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, § 48, Series A no. 296 A).
53. Although Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 contains no explicit procedural requirements, in order to assess the proportionality of the interference the Court looks at the degree of protection from arbitrariness that is afforded by the proceedings in the case (see Hentrich, cited above, § 46). In particular, the Court examines whether the proceedings concerning the interference with an applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions were attended by basic procedural safeguards. It has already held that an interference cannot be legitimate in the absence of adversarial proceedings that comply with the principle of equality of arms, enabling argument to be presented on the issues relevant for the outcome of a case (see Hentrich, cited above, § 42; and Jokela v. Finland, no. 28856/95, § 45, ECHR 2002–IV). A comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see AGOSI, cited above, § 55; Hentrich, cited above, § 49; and Jokela, cited above, § 45).
ii. Application of the above-mentioned principles in the present case
54. As it transpires from its case-law, in the area of social and economic legislation including in the area of taxation as a means of such policies States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, which in the interests of social justice and economic well-being may legitimately lead them, in the Court’s view, to adjust, cap or even reduce the amount of severance normally payable to the qualifying population. However, any such measures must be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and comply with the requirements of proportionality.
In particular, as regards the existence of a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised”, the Court notes at the outset that the Constitutional Court’s first decision can be understood to characterise the tax in question as amounting to a confiscatory measure. Moreover, tax rates exceeding 50% have been found unconstitutional in Germany, a Member State of the Council of Europe (see paragraph 19 above). However, in several European countries – such as Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy – personal income tax rates reached about 75% in the past – although those rates were usually applicable only to the highest income brackets, related to revenues clearly exceeding the amount that is contemplated in the context of the present case. It is also to be noted that the OECD average of top combined statutory personal income tax rates was 65.7% in 1981, 50.6% in 1990, 46.5% in 2000 and 41.7% in 2010 .
55. The applicable threshold in the present case was HUF 3.5 million, the amounts of severance pay falling below this limit being subject to the general personal income tax rates (a maximum of 32% in the period, see paragraph 7 above). By contrast, a tax rate of 98% was applied to that part of severance pay which exceeded the threshold.
56. In the instant case, the Court takes into consideration in the proportionality analysis that the tax rate applied exceeds considerably the rate applicable to all other revenues, without determining in abstracto whether or not the tax burden was, quantitatively speaking, confiscatory in nature. For the Court, given the margin of appreciation granted to States in matters of taxation, the applicable tax rate cannot be decisive in itself, especially in circumstances like those of the present case.
57. The Court observes that the applicant, who was entitled to severance pay according to his labour contract and whose acting in good faith has never been called into question, was subjected to the impugned measure notwithstanding the fact that the severance pay served the specific and recognised social goal of labour reintegration.
58. Moreover, to the extent that the Government may be understood to argue that certain senior managers of State-owned enterprises were capable of influencing their own benefits, which phenomenon could only be countered by targeted taxation (see paragraph 27 above), the Court is satisfied that – although the benefits in question were stipulated in the labour contract between the applicant and his employer – there is nothing in the case file to corroborate such an assumption of abuse in the case of the applicant, who in any event was not an executive of that enterprise. In particular, the Court notes that the applicant, having been in the service of the employer for about eleven years, was statutorily entitled to three months’ severance pay under the Labour Code (see paragraph 7 above), and acquired only one additional month’s amount under the labour contract.
59. As regards the personal burden which the applicant sustained on account of the impugned measure, the Court notes that he had to suffer a substantial deprivation of income in a period of presumable considerable personal difficulty, namely subsequent to the loss of employment. The Court would observe in this context that Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (see paragraph 18 above) endorses benefits providing protection in the case of loss of employment, and that according to the European Court of Justice, the aim pursued by severance pay – that is, helping dismissed employees find new employment – belongs within legitimate employment policy goals (see paragraph 18 above).
Moreover, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the applicant received the benefits in question, reduced by the then applicable taxes, several months before the change in the revenue rules, and might have disposed of it already, unaware that subsequently he would have to surrender this money, almost in its entirety, in the levying of an additional tax. For the Court, this element – that is, the absence of a transitional period within which to adjust himself to the new scheme – is likely to have exposed the applicant to substantial personal hardships. In this connection the Court recalls that taxation at a considerably higher tax rate than that in force when the revenue in question was generated could arguably be regarded as an unreasonable interference with expectations protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see M.A. and 34 Others, cited above). The tax complained of was not intended to remedy technical deficiencies of the pre-existing law, nor had the applicant enjoyed the benefit of a windfall in a changeover to a new tax-payment regime (compare and contrast, National etc., cited above, §§ 75 to 83).
60. Against this background, the Court finds that the measure complained of entailed an excessive and individual burden on the applicant’s side. This is all the more evident when considering the fact that the measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently singled out as having been paid, directly or indirectly, out of the public purse. Assuming that the impugned measure served the interest of the State budget at a time of economic hardship, the Court notes that the majority of citizens were not obliged to contribute, to a comparable extent, to the public burden.
61. The Court concludes that the specific measure in question, as applied to the applicant, even if meant to serve social justice, cannot be justified by the legitimate public interest relied on by the Government. It affected the applicant being in good-faith standing and deprived him of the larger part of an acquired right (statutorily guaranteed to a large extent), serving the special social interest of labour-market reintegration. In the Court’s opinion, those who act in good faith on the basis of law or contracts should not be frustrated in their expectations without specific and compelling reasons. Therefore the measure cannot be held to be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be realised.
62. The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
63. The applicant also complained that he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal in respect of the alleged violation of his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention.
64. The Government contested that argument in general terms.
65. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
66. Having regard to the finding relating to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 62 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine separately whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 13.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
67. The applicant further complained that those retiring immediately on dismissal were exempted from the tax in question and, mo